

Global Supply Chain Shocks and Trade Resilience: A Review Post-Covid and Ukraine Crisis

Vagish Mishra¹, Dr. Priya Sharma², Dr. Kaveri Khound³

^{1,3}Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, K.R. Mangalam University, Gurugram, Haryana, India

²Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, K.R. Mangalam University, Gurugram, Haryana, India.

Received: 28/06/2025;

Revision: 02/07/2025;

Accepted: 08/07/2025;

Published: 25/07/2025

*Corresponding author: Vagish Mishra

Abstract: Unprecedented disruptions to global supply chains in recent years have revealed their underlying weaknesses. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, two events of enormous geopolitical and economic magnitude, have fundamentally challenged the structure, operations, and assumptions that underlie international trade. This review examines the nature and consequences of these shocks critically, concentrating on their impact on global value chains, trade flows, sectoral vulnerabilities, and regional disparities. By using case studies, institutional reports, and recent literature, it looks at how these crises have reconstructed resilience as a strategic priority rather than a reactive measure. The analysis's first section deconstructs the scope and timeline of supply chain failures, from food and energy insecurity following the conflict in Ukraine to labor shortages and port congestion during the pandemic. It examines in detail the effects on the automotive, agricultural, and pharmaceutical industries in addition to assessing the macroeconomic ramifications, including inflationary pressures, GDP contractions, and increased protectionism. It also examines how these upheavals have made inequality in the world worse by disproportionately impacting developing nations and smaller economies. At the core of the review is a discussion of trade resilience, including its frameworks, metrics, and evolving definitions. The study looks at how policy responses like reshoring, stockpiling, and international trade reforms have been used in tandem with corporate initiatives involving digital transformation and risk diversification. The ability of cutting-edge technologies like blockchain, artificial intelligence, and digital twins to facilitate real-time supply chain agility and visibility is assessed. Critical issues are also noted in the review, such as unequal access to resilience resources, poor coordination, climate vulnerabilities, and threats to digital security. A forward-looking viewpoint on how to institutionalize resilience in international trade is provided in the concluding sections. It urges a deliberate change to supply chains that are inclusive, locally based, and ecologically responsible. This paper promotes a comprehensive resilience framework that strikes a balance between efficiency, adaptability, and equity by highlighting cooperation between governments, corporations, and international organizations.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine conflict, COVID-19 pandemic, global supply chain resilience, trade disruption, and sustainable trade policy

INTRODUCTION

Complex systems known as global supply chains let raw materials, parts, and completed products move across borders before being consumed. These linked networks have grown to be the foundation of world commerce, allowing businesses to benefit from national comparative advantages. Companies have maximized costs and efficiency through outsourcing, offshoring, and just-in-time (JIT) production among other means [1]. Before 2020, globalization with strongly rising trade volumes enabled hitherto unheard-of market integration. The WTO said a consistent rise in world trade from the 1990s until the 2008 financial crisis followed by a strong recovery. Efficiency-oriented globalization was embodied by the JIT concept [2]. By depending on accurate, on-time supply of parts, companies reduced inventory holding expenses. This lean inventory approach, however, raised susceptibility to disturbances. JIT systems reduced buffers, which made companies very reliant on quick and dependable cross-border flows [3]. As production was more dispersed across areas, the already difficult world supply chain got even more so. For example, automotive manufacturing spanned

thousands of parts procured worldwide; a disturbance at any node could stop whole production lines [4]. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia-Ukraine conflict have exposed the fragility of this global system. The very structure that made supply chains efficient also rendered them susceptible to cascading shocks. As we moved through 2020–2024, supply chain resilience—previously an afterthought—emerged as a critical concern for both policymakers and business leaders [5].

Objectives of the Review:

This review aims to examine the nature, causes, and consequences of recent global supply chain shocks with a focus on the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war [6]. Specifically, it seeks to:

- Analyze the direct and indirect disruptions in supply networks caused by these events.
- Examine the macroeconomic and sector-specific impacts on global trade [7].
- Assess policy responses, corporate adaptations, and the role of technology in building supply chain resilience.

- Identify vulnerabilities and offer recommendations for future-proofing global trade [8].

By synthesizing insights from empirical studies, policy briefs, and industry reports, this paper provides a comprehensive understanding of evolving global trade dynamics [9].

Methodology

The methodology for this review includes a critical examination of multidisciplinary literature—peer-reviewed journal articles, working papers, government policy briefs, and industry case studies [10]. The primary data sources span three academic publications analyzed: Grondys & Kot (2023), Raga et al. (2025), and Giovannetti et al. (2023). These documents provide an in-depth perspective on global disruptions, trade reconfigurations, and regional resilience strategies [11].

To support qualitative analysis, the review also integrates relevant quantitative data, including GDP contractions, trade flow statistics, and survey results from global firms. These insights enable a nuanced interpretation of the multifaceted crisis faced by supply chains [12].

2. COVID-19 and Global Supply chain disruption:

2.1 Pandemic-Related supply shocks:

The onset of COVID-19 in early 2020 triggered unprecedented global disruption. Lockdowns, border closures, labor shortages, and factory shutdowns brought multiple industries to a standstill [13]. Global supply chains—built on seamless cross-border movement—were paralyzed. Early disruptions in China, the "world’s factory," caused ripple effects worldwide. The automotive, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and food sectors saw severe component shortages, leading to temporary closures and production delays (Grondys & Kot, 2023) [14].

Key disruptions included port congestions, container shortages, and suspended freight operations. The maritime industry experienced up to 30% capacity loss at peak periods [15]. In manufacturing, overreliance on a few geographic nodes led to systemic vulnerabilities. For example, semiconductor shortages triggered by factory shutdowns in East Asia caused delays across global automotive and tech sectors [16].

The pandemic also triggered a shift in consumption patterns. Panic buying, increased e-commerce, and higher demand for essential goods led to demand-supply mismatches [17]. Simultaneously, the JIT strategy backfired. With minimal inventories, firms were unprepared for extended delays. The cost of shipping a container from Asia to Europe, for instance, rose sixfold in 2021 [18].

Table 1: Key Disruptions During the COVID-19 Pandemic

| Disruption Type | Impact on Supply Chain |
|-----------------|---|
| Border Closures | Halted cross-border movement of goods |
| Labor Shortages | Reduced output in manufacturing/logistics |
| Port Congestion | Shipping delays, backlog of cargo |
| Shift in Demand | Stockouts of essentials, excess of others |

Businesses started reevaluating their supply chain plans, putting more emphasis on robust systems than lean ones [19]. Digital tracking, nearshoring, and geographic diversification became popular. The crisis brought to light the necessity of buffer inventories, data-driven forecasting, and real-time visibility [20].

2.2 Other emerging supply chain threats:

Another structural jolt came from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Apart from geopolitical unrest, it caused great disturbances in the transportation, agriculture, and energy sectors. Major supplier of grains, sunflower oil, and fertilizers, Ukraine's export routes jammed by port blockades Western sanctions against Russia—one of the biggest energy suppliers—caused worldwide gas and fuel prices to soar [21]. The crisis caused severe energy shortages in Europe especially impacting energy-intensive industries including aluminum, steel, and manufacturing. Globally, fuel prices affected transportation, logistics, and production expenses. Countries in Africa and the Middle East, dependent on Ukrainian grain, faced food insecurity [23]and inflation as well (Raga et al. , 2025).

Table 2: War-Induced Supply Chain Disruptions

| Sector | Impact |
|----------------|--|
| Energy | Gas price hikes, reduced industrial output |
| Agriculture | Grain export disruptions, rising food prices |
| Transportation | Delays due to rerouted trade flows |

Additionally, military conscription caused skilled workers from Ukraine to leave the logistics industry, leading to a staffing shortage [24]. The war highlighted the perils of becoming overly dependent on a single geopolitical region and reaffirmed the necessity of accounting for political risk in supply chain strategies [25].

2.3 Other Contributing Factors:

Global supply chains still face new risks after these major events:

- Geopolitical tensions:** U.S.–China trade conflicts, potential Taiwan conflict, and increasing economic nationalism.

- **Climate events:** Floods, wildfires, and hurricanes disrupt production and transportation.
 - **Cybersecurity threats:** Increasing digitalization exposes supply chains to data breaches and cyber-attacks.
- The necessity of integrated, proactive risk management is highlighted by these multifactorial risks. In order to model and anticipate disruptions, organizations are now looking for digital twins and multi-tier supplier visibility [26].




Figure.1 Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic on Global Energy, Products, and Services 2018–2024 [Made by Authors].

In 2020, COVID-19 led to sharp decreases in the worldwide supply of goods and services; slow recovery is anticipated till 2024. Prolonged limitations caused services to recover the slowest. The supply chain disruption brought on by COVID-19 was extraordinary in both scope and length, especially for services and consumer products, as seen above in figure.1. These steep drops draw attention to the delicate construction of worldwide supply chains that were not designed for long-duration systematic events. Highly reliant on physical contact and mobility, the services sector suffered the most depression and the slowest recovery.

3. Impact of Russia-Ukraine Crisis:
3.1 Global Trade Volatility:

Supply chain disturbances include the COVID-19 epidemic and Russia-Ukraine war have resonated throughout world economies, causing complex macroeconomic consequences. Between 2020 and 2023, trade contraction, inflationary pressures, and GDP slowdowns replaced positive economic growth as the new norm [27]. Estimates by international financial organizations indicate that the overall world GDP shrinking from these events ranged from 3. 5% to 4. 4% in 2020, with certain Eastern Europe and Africa countries experiencing losses beyond 6%. Driven by commodity scarcities, increased energy prices, and disrupted logistics, supply-push inflation became a continuous problem. Crude oil, natural gas, wheat, and fertilizer prices soared, straining companies as well as households. Countries heavily dependent on imports of these basics, especially developing countries, experienced worse financial balances and higher consumer price indices (CPI) [28]. Another long-term macroeconomic effect was a change in monetary and fiscal policy approaches. Although central banks all raised interest rates to fight inflation, increased borrowing costs restrained investment and slowed down recovery. Maintaining development budget given rising debt loads many of which surged during the epidemic years presented difficulties for fiscal authorities [29]. At high risk of debt distress by 2024, Raga et al. (2025) notes at least 20 African countries. These events spurred an update of trade dependency patterns and economic theories. Regionalism, strategic autonomy, and economic resilience planning are softening the formerly dominant version of hyper-globalization [30].



Figure.2 Effects of the Russia-Ukraine War on World Energy, Products, and Service Supply (2021–2025) [Made by Authors]. Beginning in 2022, the Russia-Ukraine conflict caused significant interruptions in energy supply with ramifications for goods (notably food and fertilizers) and services (owing to route reconfigurations and labor displacement) refer figure.2. Particularly in Europe and Africa, these supply shortages worsened inflationary pressures worldwide. The protracted energy shock caused over-reliance on single suppliers to be exposed and so set off a rethinking of trade routes and strategic independence.

3.2 Sector-wise Impacts:

The ripple effects of global disruptions varied across sectors.

- **Automotive and Semiconductors:** The shortage of microchips—originating from East Asian manufacturing bottlenecks—crippled global vehicle production. Major automakers including Ford, GM, and Volkswagen temporarily halted operations [31].
- **Food and Agriculture:** The disruption of grain and fertilizer exports from Ukraine, coupled with climate anomalies, led to severe food shortages in parts of Africa and the Middle East. This also spiked global food prices and impacted food processing industries.
- **Pharmaceuticals and Medical Goods:** COVID-19 emphasized the world's overreliance on specific countries for critical health supplies. Pharmaceutical supply chain vulnerabilities were revealed by PPE shortages, vaccine supply disputes, and active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) bottlenecks [32].

3. 2. 1 Scholarly Ideas on Food Price Shocks and Geopolitical Events;

The research paper titled “Is geopolitical risk interconnected? Evidence from Russian-Ukraine crisis” (Ahmed, et al, Nov,2023) clearly describes the catastrophic impact of geopolitical crisis reflected through Russia-Ukraine war. According to the study, stock markets have long-run and continuous effects from this war. It offers a study of the interconnections among worldwide equity markets—comprising a sample of twenty-seven global equity markets including seventeen developed, nine

developing, and an actor country (i.e., Russia). Mostly carried out following the Russia-Ukraine conflict, this research concentrated on the good or bad influence of Russia's absence from the world equity market. The paper concluded that Russia's exclusion from the worldwide equity market has an effect on the global network. It pointed out that networks with greater market interconnectedness were contracting as a result of the conflict. A thorough examination of such a scenario reveals the growing inertia in the worldwide equity markets brought on by decreased network density. The study also shows that even if the crisis starting with the Russia-Ukraine war did not directly change network characteristics, indirect structural changes found their roots after the crisis [101]. Therefore, the study advises nations to create such market plans that support the equity market and minimize the bad effects of geopolitical crisis. Moreover, the research article "The confluence of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Effects on agricultural commodity prices and food security," (Ural, et al, May 2024) examines the impact of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war on average return, contagion dynamics, and persistence of risks related with three staples in Turkey: wheat, corn, and sunflower oil; it notes that rising food insecurity resulted from disturbance in fertilizer, grain, and oil seeds supplies. The paper also underlines that two events occur over the long term: first, the long-term uncertainty arising from one market aggravates the uncertainty in that market but second, it reduces bad consequences on other markets. The paper contends that thorough policies aimed at rural growth, which would assure farmers access to inputs, enable measures to reduce market risks, may enable domestic production expansion. The study adds that "results also show that exchange rate fluctuations have exacerbated the effects of the war between Russia and Ukraine as well as those of the pandemic. Market risk mitigation could involve the agricultural exchange to support an expanded number of licensed grain warehouses. In a broader scholarly context, this study stresses the interaction between global shocks, market uncertainty, and safeguarding the nation's food security" [102].

4. Trade Resilience: Concepts and Frameworks:

The idea of trade resilience has been brought front and center in global politics and business strategy by the disturbances felt over the last few years. At its foundation, trade resilience is the capacity of a country, area, or company to endure, adjust to, and bounce back from outside disturbances threatening supply chain continuity. Resilience is a strategic necessity now in light of the Russia-Ukraine war and the COVID-19 epidemic rather than a passive trait of strong countries. Along with absorbing shocks, a resilient supply chain reacts to changing world circumstances by adapting and changing. Theoretical foundations of trade resilience are investigated in this chapter together with practical frameworks and the instruments employed to assess global supply networks' vulnerability and robustness [33]. Clarifying the three main aspects of trade resilience—resistance, recovery, and adaptability—will help one to begin to grasp it. Resistance is the ability of a system to reduce the effects of a disturbance. Adaptability refers to how effectively a system can change to avoid next disturbances or reduce their effects; recovery is the capacity to revert to usual processes following a shock [34]. Together, these aspects define a system's degree of resilience. Many supply chains historically designed for efficiency—that is, with an emphasis on cost-cutting and speed—sacrificed these resilience aspects. As the events of 2020 onward clearly show, this trade-off has shown to be expensive. Through a lens provided by supply chain vulnerability indicators, one can assess and manage brittleness. Key indicators are supplier concentration, trade route congestion, dependency ratios, and logistical network complexity. For instance, a nation with more than 80% reliance on one foreign source for medical supplies or energy is automatically exposed [35]. This holds true for businesses mostly dependent on one port or transit nation either. Such chokepoints were sometimes linked to supply bottlenecks during the epidemic. Particularly in Europe and Africa, the conflict in Ukraine underlined even more the dangers of reliance on energy and food sources. Several international standards that have been developed are being used to evaluate and compare resilience. The FM Global Resilience Index is one tool that takes into account economic strength, risk quality, and supply chain conditions in 130 different countries [36]. Another is the DHL Resilience360 system, which provides real-time risk assessment for logistics disruptions in the geopolitical, cyber, and environmental domains. These methods help governments and businesses identify weaknesses and develop targeted risk reduction strategies [37]. Finding or replicating is not the only way to build resilience. Maintaining strategic reserves or reshoring production closer to home, even though they might provide buffers, might not be long-term viable or sufficient. Instead, the best strategy blends flexibility and firmness by utilizing blockchain for supplier traceability, IoT for real-time logistics monitoring, and AI-driven demand forecasting across multiple digital technologies. This enables a shift from reactive control to proactive supply chain management [38]. Finally, international collaboration and institutional frameworks play a major role in resilience. Systemic resilience can be enhanced by trade agreements

that include mutual standard recognition, emergency response coordination, and accelerated customs procedures [39]. For instance, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) promises market integration in addition to stabilizing regional supply chains. Trade resilience is essentially a complicated idea that necessitates a shift in perspective from optimization focused on efficiency to a balanced strategy that incorporates readiness, responsiveness, and adaptability [40]. A system's ability to learn, adapt, and grow in the face of uncertainty is just as important to its resilience as its structural durability. As global shocks become more frequent and challenging, it is imperative that resilience be incorporated into trade policy and corporate strategy [41].

Table 3: Sector-Wise Impacts of Supply Chain Shocks [42]

| Sector | Key Disruptions | Impact |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Automotive | Chip shortages, labor disruptions | Halted production, higher prices |
| Food & Agriculture | Blocked grain routes, input shortages | Food insecurity, inflation |
| Pharmaceuticals | Limited API exports, export bans | Shortages of essential medicines |

5. Regional Disparities:

Uneven regional effects have resulted from the worldwide nature of supply chain shocks. High-income nations, with more strong infrastructure and money, adjusted more quickly to supply shocks. They could more easily absorb inflationary pressures, provide subsidies for vital goods, and find substitute suppliers [43]. Developing countries, on the other hand, struggled with growing problems. Without financial buffers, many depended mostly on one trade partner. Eastern European countries, for instance, had significant fuel supply problems brought on by their nearness to Russia; African countries suffered most under food and fertilizer shortages. Trade blocs such ASEAN and the EU performed variably [44]. Some effects were softened by the EU's combined policy replies—strategic reserves and financial coordination. ASEAN countries, though varied in sourcing, suffered delays brought about by port congestion and reliance on Chinese manufacturing. This uneven exposure emphasizes how urgently inclusive and just trade resilience strategies that take into account regional structural flaws are needed.

6. Policy and Corporate Responses:

Faced with the unprecedented stress experienced by world supply chains in the wake of the COVID-19 epidemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, governments and companies alike have had to review, reconstruct, and strengthen their operational and strategic trade approaches. The reaction has been multi-level, including quick crisis management, medium-term restructuring, and long-term reorientation toward resilient and sustainable systems. This part analyzes the variety of policy and corporate-level responses that have grown over recent years with reshoring policies,

global cooperation mechanisms, and technological transformation initiatives emphasized. One of the most noticeable policy changes has been the rise in industrial policies that support strategic independence [45]. Many countries began to question the idea of excessive global interdependence, especially in critical sectors like energy, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. In response, rising governments adopted friends-shoring, nearshoring, or reshoring. For example, in order to increase national production, the US and the EU put in place incentive programs and stimulus measures. Japan offered financial incentives to companies that moved their production from China. These changes are driven by risk mitigation, which includes creating more geographically diverse production ecosystems and reducing reliance on geopolitically sensitive regions, in addition to economic nationalism [46]. Conversely, reshoring isn't always feasible or financially advantageous in every situation. An overemphasis on local production, according to critics, can lead to inefficiency, higher customer costs, and trade restrictions as retaliation. As a result, some countries have made the decision to emphasize the development of strategic reserves and supply chain diversity. These reserves, which include food items, rare earth metals, and essential medical supplies, are meant to act as a buffer against unforeseen disruptions and global price increases. International efforts to simultaneously increase resilience and facilitate trade have increased dramatically [47].

Organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and regional institutions have called for increased transparency, streamlined customs processes, and mutual recognition agreements [48]. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is particularly seen as an essential tool for promoting intraregional trade, which could protect the continent from external shocks like the Russia-Ukraine conflict. According to Raga et al. (2025), African nations could partially offset supply reductions from Russia and Ukraine if they increased intra-African fertilizer trade [49].

The corporate sphere has also been dynamic, albeit with significant variation across sectors. Prominent global companies have boosted their investments in digital supply chain management systems. Real-time risk assessment and faster reaction times are made possible by incorporating artificial intelligence, machine learning, and predictive analytics into supply chain operations. Blockchain technology and other technologies are being used to improve traceability and reduce the opacity of multi-tier supplier networks [50]. These innovations are essential to risk management, compliance assurance, and quick local disruption response. Additionally, businesses are increasingly incorporating sustainability as a key element into their supply chain strategy.

The concept of a "circular economy," which involves reusing, recycling, and sourcing materials sustainably, has gained popularity, especially in the European Union [51]. This approach reduces dependence on erratic global markets while also lessening its impact on the environment. The argument that ethical and sustainable supply chains need to be strong has been reinforced by corporate commitments to ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance)

standards. Furthermore, supply chains are now more aware of labor-related concerns as a result of the pandemic and the war [52]. In Ukraine, army conscription and migrant labor disruptions during COVID-19 exposed businesses' shortcomings in human resource continuity. As a result, companies have begun to automate, reevaluate workforce management, and develop more comprehensive labor contingency plans. In summary, responses to global supply chain shocks have been diverse and intricate, encompassing national policy shifts, international collaboration, and corporate model innovation [53]. The coordinated shift toward digital transformation, diversification, and regional cooperation signifies a significant shift in the conception and management of global trade systems, even though no single strategy offers a universal answer. The challenge now is to institutionalize these responses into long-lasting structures capable of anticipatorily safeguarding the world economy against the next inevitable shock [54].

7. Technological Enablers for Resilience:

In the contemporary global economy, technology has emerged as a crucial component for creating and sustaining strong supply networks [55]. With disruptions becoming more frequent, complex, and global in scope, traditional supply chain management techniques—which frequently rely on human collaboration and static forecasting—have proven to be insufficient. Instead, supply chains are changing in terms of how they operate, adapt, and respond to events due to digital transformation, automation, and data-driven decision-making [56]. This section explores how technology plays a crucial role in enhancing visibility, responsiveness, and flexibility in the global trading environment [57]. The core of technological resilience is the ability to see supply chain operations in real time. Businesses now manage warehouses, track inventories, and monitor shipments using cloud computing and Internet of Things (IoT) devices [58].

Sensors installed in storage facilities and transportation vehicles provide minute-by-minute updates on the location and condition of goods, allowing businesses to identify delays or interruptions right away [59]. This level of traceability and monitoring is particularly important for products that are sensitive to temperature, such as vaccines, fresh produce, or chemical reagents [60]. Since air and sea routes were regularly closed or altered with little warning during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, real-time monitoring systems were crucial [61]. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have also emerged as crucial tools in predictive logistics [62]. Large datasets can be analyzed by these systems to forecast demand trends, identify potential bottlenecks, and optimize inventory allocation [63].

In order to dynamically reroute shipments or modify purchasing plans, AI-powered systems can evaluate historical shipping patterns in addition to real-time data, such as weather, political unrest, or port activity [64]. For instance, businesses that applied predictive analysis could reduce losses from unused cargo by proactively changing routes during the port congestion issue in late 2021. The use of blockchain technology is equally revolutionary [65]. Blockchain provides transparent, end-to-end documentation of supply chain transactions and is well-

known for its permanent and safe record-keeping capabilities. This is especially crucial in industries where concerns about legal compliance, ethical sourcing, or counterfeiting exist [66]. Blockchain enhances stakeholder trust, expedites audits, and expedites dispute resolution processes by establishing an irreversible digital ledger. It has been effectively used in pharmaceutical supply networks to verify the legitimacy of drugs and in the diamond industry to track origins free from conflict [67]. Automation and robotics represent yet another technological frontier in supply chain resilience. Automated guided vehicles (AGVs), robotic arms, and smart packaging lines are increasingly common in warehouses and manufacturing facilities [68]. These systems aid in reducing reliance on human labor, which has proven to be a vulnerability during labor strikes and pandemics. Additionally, robotics increases scalability, speed, and accuracy, allowing businesses to adapt to changing demands without compromising operational efficacy [69]. The push for digital twins, or virtual versions of actual supply networks, is another positive trend. Before implementing physical changes, these models allow businesses to test contingency plans and perform "what-if" analysis, enhance emergency responses, and evaluate the impact of supplier changes or geopolitical instability in a risk-free digital environment [70]. Crucially, adoption of technology is not limited to the commercial sector. Governments and trade organizations have implemented technology-driven customs processes, port automation, and cross-border data-sharing systems. The European Union's Customs Data Hub and Africa's Single Window systems are two examples of efforts to digitally change and streamline trade procedures at a systemic level [71]. These public infrastructure projects contribute to the development of a global trade network that is more resilient, adaptable, and open. Technology offers powerful resources, but it also presents problems [72]. High initial costs, cybersecurity risks, disparities in digital literacy, and disjointed standards continue to be significant barriers, especially for low-income nations and small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs). Thus, closing the digital divide is essential. Development banks and multilateral organizations play a major role in funding tech adoption and capacity-building initiatives in under-resourced areas [73]. From blockchain and robotics to artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things, digital tools provide previously unheard-of capabilities for shock prediction, absorption, and recovery [74]. But in order to reach their full potential, they need funding, cooperation, and inclusive frameworks that ensure all economies, regardless of size or wealth, can take advantage of the digital revolution in trade [76].

8. Case Studies:

Analyzing supply chain shocks and resilience in real-world contexts requires looking at specific industry case studies that highlight vulnerabilities and adaptive strategies [77]. In addition to illustrating the diverse ways in which various sectors have been affected, these examples offer valuable insights for future risk mitigation [78]. Disruptions to food security, reliance on pharmaceutical supplies, and shortages of automotive chips underscore the importance, challenges, and strategic needs of sustaining global trade in

times of crisis [79].

The first case study focuses on the automotive sector, particularly the shortage of semiconductors that became a global bottleneck during the COVID-19 pandemic and persisted into the conflict in Ukraine. Microchips, sometimes referred to as semiconductors, are essential to modern automobiles for everything from entertainment and safety features to engine control. Chip supplies were diverted from the automotive sector early in the epidemic due to a combination of East Asian factory closures and an increase in demand for consumer electronics. When the demand for automobiles began to rebound in late 2020, manufacturers were unable to get enough chips, which led to brief halts in production at large corporations like Ford, General Motors, and Toyota. While GM and others suffered longer-term production losses, Toyota, which is well-known for its lean inventory strategy, demonstrated incredible resilience by quickly reallocating resources and taking advantage of long-standing supplier relationships. In the wake of the crisis, numerous automakers have begun to reevaluate their supply plans, placing a greater emphasis on localizing chip manufacturing and buffering inventory [80].

The second case looks at global food security, which was severely impacted by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Russia and Ukraine are major suppliers of fertilizers, sunflower oil, barley, and wheat. Food production was halted, Black Sea ports were closed, and the cost of necessities skyrocketed as a result of the invasion. Due to their heavy reliance on these imports, countries in the Middle East and North Africa experienced food shortages as well as inflation. Nations such as Tunisia and Egypt turned to other suppliers and increased local stocks in response [81]. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, negotiated by the United Nations, was a major turning point as it briefly reopened corridors for grain exports. This case shows how strongly regional dependence and geopolitical instability can jeopardize food security and stresses the necessity of varied sourcing and regional trade agreements in fostering resiliency [82].

A third lesson case focuses on drug supply networks, especially the world's reliance on India and China for active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs). The epidemic showed the degree to which even affluent countries rely for vital medications and medical supplies on a small number of foreign vendors. Early in lockdowns, export bans and factory closures in China and India led to severe global shortages of antivirals, antibiotics, and personal protective equipment (PPE). The emergency manufacturing licenses were invoked, immediate stockpiling started, and domestic medicine manufacture became newly much discussed as a result of the crisis. For instance, while the European Union invested in regional pharmaceutical centers, the United States passed laws promoting local drug manufacture [83]. Moreover, in the industry real-time supply chain monitoring and inventory management have evolved to be commonplace on digital platforms that increase responsiveness and openness. From the strategic benefits of long-term supplier partnerships in the automotive industry to the geopolitical and humanitarian hazards linked to agricultural supply chains and the vital role of regulatory and digital solutions in pharmaceutical logistics, each of

these case studies highlights various aspects of supply chain resilience. Shared lessons connect them [84]: resiliency results from a multifactorial and ongoing process combining foresight, diversification, cooperation, and technical adoption rather than from a single policy or action. These examples not only draw attention to current shortcomings but also demonstrate how more robust and equitable global trade systems could be developed in the future [85].

9. Challenges and Gaps:

The development of robust and inclusive trading networks is still hampered by significant barriers and structural flaws, despite significant progress in identifying and fixing global supply chain weaknesses. Since these issues span the financial, political, technological, and social domains, they require in-depth research to inform more effective future resilience plans. As nations and companies attempt to transform reactive crisis responses into long-term policy frameworks, it is critical to comprehend these disparities in order to build robust global trade infrastructure. One of the main issues is unequal access to resources and capacity for resilience-building. Even though high-income countries and multinational corporations have quickly adopted cutting-edge technologies, expanded their supplier bases, and established strategic reserves, many developing nations are left out of these changes [86]. Low-income countries find it difficult to implement the structural changes required for resilience due to their inadequate infrastructure, reliance on a limited range of exports or suppliers, and limited financial resources. For example, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced significantly greater economic instability during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war due to their reliance on imported food, fuel, and fertilizers. Their ability to use stimulus programs to promote imports or mitigate societal effects was constrained by the lack of fiscal room. As a result, global resilience initiatives run the risk of becoming out of balance, with developed regions bolstering their infrastructure and underdeveloped countries dealing with ongoing instability [87]. Communication between parties inside and outside of national borders represents yet another significant gap. Conflicting national priorities during emergencies, such as restrictions on the export of food or medical supplies, could exacerbate global shortages and jeopardize coordinated responses. Because there are no standardized policies or crisis contingency procedures, even well-prepared actors are susceptible to disruptions coming from other parts of the chain [88]. Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, a surge in protectionist trade policies, such as restrictions on essential exports, demonstrated how easily cooperation can falter under pressure. Similar patterns emerged during the conflict in Ukraine, when disruptions in the energy supply triggered conflicting responses from EU member states, undermining collective energy security policies [89]. These events show how urgently pre-existing multilateral alliances and trust-based structures are needed to ensure unity in the face of international difficulties. The combination of climate change and supply chain weakness is another emerging issue. Climate-related disruptions, from hurricanes and wildfires to floods and droughts, are increasingly impacting

production regions and trade routes. Numerous global value chains have not integrated climate resilience into their strategy or are adequately prepared to explain these environmental hazards [90].

Paradoxically, some measures to increase supply chain resilience may worsen environmental harm by increasing emissions and resource consumption through buffer stockpiling and reshoring. The challenge of finding a balance between sustainability and resilience is highlighted by this contradiction. Improving resilience in the short term runs the risk of endangering long-term climate goals if policy planning is not coordinated. There is a significant and widening gap in cybersecurity vulnerabilities in contemporary supply networks [91]. As businesses digitize their operations and embrace technologies like blockchain, IoT, and AI, they become more susceptible to cyberattacks. Attacks on logistics networks, production systems, or customs databases have the potential to disrupt operations, expose sensitive data, and cause significant delays [92]. Nevertheless, a large number of SMEs, particularly in developing countries, either lack the skills or resources required to implement robust cyber security measures. This digital divide creates disparities in resilience and poses a shared risk to globally integrated networks. Social inclusion and resilience frameworks are ultimately incompatible. Inequalities that already exist are often exacerbated by crises, particularly those that cut across gender and income boundaries. For example, women may face greater job insecurity and limited access to financial resources during supply disruptions. Ignoring these distinctions in policy responses runs the risk of escalating structural inequality. Women's economic recovery was ignored during the epidemic because male-headed households were disproportionately favored by gender-blind cash transfer programs and labor schemes, as demonstrated in Kenya and Egypt [93]. Resilience must incorporate gender-sensitive and socially inclusive strategies at every stage, from the creation of policies to their execution, in order to be comprehensive and equitable. Essentially, there are still a lot of gaps even though there has been progress in planning and initiating resilience initiatives across supply networks. These include social inequalities, cyber vulnerabilities, environmental trade-offs, unequal access to resources, and poor coordination. In addition to financial support and technological development, closing these gaps requires a reevaluation of global governance norms and systems. Instead of merely recovering from shocks, true resilience focuses on advancing inclusively and sustainably. The next phase of global trade should prioritize these needs in order to safeguard the planet from future disruptions [94].

10. Future Outlook and Policy Recommendations:

The future of supply chain resilience depends on inclusive innovation, strategic foresight, and concerted action as the global economy bounces back and reorganizes after numerous disruptions. International commerce systems have been put through a great deal of stress by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has made their benefits and drawbacks abundantly clear. Moving past reactive responses to these disasters necessitates a proactive strategy that integrates resilience

into emergency protocols and the real architecture of international trade. This section outlines trade resilience's future and makes policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more safe, equitable, and sustainable global trading environment [95].

Globalization urgently needs to be reset from the perspective of strategic regionalism. While complete self-sufficiency is impractical and ineffective, excessive production in small areas has been shown to have negative consequences. In order to rebalance supply chains, governments and multinational corporations must work together to support local manufacturing hubs, particularly in sectors deemed essential—like food, energy, and health. Regional industrial clusters in Asia and Latin America, as well as initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), are encouraging examples. In addition to reducing exposure to distant disruptions, these local efforts promote regional trade and development. Public-private collaboration will be at the heart of resilient trade systems. National governments must create advantageous conditions through legislative changes, infrastructure investments, and tax breaks, while private businesses must prioritize transparency, diversification, and long-term planning over immediate efficiency. Grants for digital infrastructure upgrades or tax breaks for supplier diversification, for example, can incentivize businesses to integrate resilience into their operations. Additionally, stronger institutional frameworks—like emergency trade task forces or national resilience councils—can speed up response times and coordination in times of crisis [96].

Spending on tangible and intangible infrastructure also needs to be accelerated. Hard infrastructure consists of refurbished ports, railroads, and logistical parks, whereas soft infrastructure consists of digital systems, standard harmonization, and the development of skilled labor. Artificial intelligence and blockchain are examples of emerging technologies that will only yield meaningful outcomes if supported by inclusive, interoperable, and accessible infrastructure. Additionally, low-income countries require assistance in building this infrastructure; international collaboration is required, with development finance organizations spearheading the effort to bridge the investment gap. The principles of the circular economy and environmental sustainability should also be reflected in policy [97].

Green supply chain practices must be integrated since climate change is posing an increasing threat to the planet. Governments can implement carbon border adjustment programs and offer subsidies for environmentally friendly production and sourcing. International trade agreements should gradually incorporate environmental regulations to encourage sustainable practices without becoming defensive measures. In this hypothetical world, sustainability and resilience are interdependent rather than distinct. Equity and inclusion must be incorporated into resilience theory. The burden of shocks disproportionately affects marginalized communities, especially women and low-income individuals, as demonstrated by supply chain disruptions [98].

Initiatives for gender-responsive budgeting, inclusive labor practices, and financial inclusion can ensure that resilience programs empower all societal levels. The opinions of

indigenous peoples, women-led businesses, and the Global South must be purposefully incorporated into the design and implementation of policies for global trade systems. Finally, multilateralism needs to be reimagined for a more ambiguous setting. It is necessary to enable and reorganize organizations like the WTO, IMF, and UNCTAD in order to better coordinate global responses to supply chain disasters [99]. Global preparedness can be enhanced by standard resilience metrics, pre-established emergency plans, and real-time information sharing. Beyond tariff reductions, future trade agreements should include provisions for crisis-driven trade facilitation, shared inventories, and backup plans. The path of international trade resilience is essentially determined by a well-balanced marriage of inclusive technology, sustainable development, collaborative governance, and regional empowerment. The recent shocks have been significant, but they also present an opportunity to rebuild global trade on a foundation of sustainability, equity, and foresight. Instead of implementing resilience as a stopgap, policymakers, businesses, and international organizations should seize this opportunity to make it a guiding principle for the connected world of the future [100].

CONCLUSION

The complexity and fragility of global supply networks have been made clear in recent years. The Russian-Ukrainian war and the COVID-19 pandemic revealed systemic weaknesses as seismic events, despite mobilizing efforts to build more robust and flexible trading networks. This analysis has tracked the development of these crises, evaluated the macroeconomic and industry-specific impacts, and assessed the multi-level responses implemented by international organizations, businesses, and governments. The core of this research is the understanding that resilience must be ingrained in trade systems as a continuous strategic priority, not just as a quick fix. Concepts like digital transformation, diversity, and regionalization have emerged as key forces behind this resilience. At the same time, the balance between readiness and efficiency must be restored. Countries have been exposed to cascading disruptions due to over-optimization for speed and cost without taking any precautions. Stakeholder engagement, policy reform, and technological innovation are the pillars of supply networks that are prepared for the future. Nonetheless, resilience must be sustainable and equitable. Inequalities in digital infrastructure, institutional capacity, and resource access must be addressed, particularly in the Global South, in order to achieve inclusive recovery. Additionally, resilience strategies need to align with climate goals and social justice agendas to ensure that solutions don't trade long-term exposure for short-term gains. In the end, the global business landscape is evolving. Either the pre-crisis state can be restored, or a system that can withstand future shocks and encourage inclusive growth can be established. The latter—a robust, adaptable, forward-thinking global supply chain model based on collaboration, creativity, and shared accountability—is supported by this review.

REFERENCES

1. Raj A, Mukherjee AA, De Sousa Jabbour ABL, Srivastava SK. Supply chain management during and post-COVID-19 pandemic: Mitigation strategies and practical lessons learned. *J Bus Res*. 2022;142:1125–1139. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.01.037>
2. Reshmi TR. Information security breaches due to ransomware attacks—a systematic literature review. *Int J Inf Manag Data Insights*. 2021;1(2):100013. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjime.2021.100013>
3. Sarkar BD, Shankar R. Understanding the barriers of port logistics for effective operation in the Industry 4.0 era: Data-driven decision making. *Int J Inf Manag Data Insights*. 2021;1(2):100031. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jjime.2021.100031>
4. Scheibe KP, Blackhurst J. Supply chain disruption propagation: a systemic risk and normal accident theory perspective. *Int J Prod Res*. 2018;56(1-2):43–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2017.1355123>
5. Araz OM, Choi T, Olson DL, Salman FS. Data Analytics for Operational Risk Management. *Decis Sci*. 2020;51(6):1316–1319. <https://doi.org/10.1111/deci.12443>
6. Butt AS. Understanding the implications of pandemic outbreaks on supply chains: An exploratory study of the effects caused by the COVID-19 across four South Asian countries and steps taken by firms to address the disruptions. *Int J Phys Distrib Logist Manag*. 2021;52(4):370–392. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-08-2020-0281>
7. Butt AS. Strategies to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on supply chain disruptions: a multiple case analysis of buyers and distributors. *Int J Logist Manag*. 2021; ahead-of-print. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJLM-11-2020-0455>
8. Cardoso BFO, Fontainha TC, Leiras A. Disasters' impact on supply chains and countermeasure strategies: an overview of the academic literature. *Braz J Oper Prod Manag*. 2022;19(2):e20221429. <https://doi.org/10.14488/BJOPM.2021.05>
9. Chandasiri O. The COVID-19: impact on education. *J Asian Afr Soc Sci Humanit*. 2020;6(2):37–42.
10. Choi TM, Kumar S, Yue X, Chan HL. Disruptive technologies and operations management in the Industry 4.0 era and beyond. *Prod Oper Manag*. 2022;31(1):9–31. <https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13622>
11. Cooper K, Hards E, Moltrecht B, et al. Loneliness, social relationships, and mental health in adolescents during the COVID-19 pandemic. *J Affect Disord*. 2021;289:98–104. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2021.04.016>
12. Davis KF, Downs S, Gephart JA. Towards food supply chain resilience to environmental shocks. *Nat Food*. 2021;2(1):54–62. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-020-00196-3>
13. Nikolopoulos K, Punia S, Schäfers A, Tsinopoulos C, Vasilakis C. Forecasting and planning during a pandemic: COVID-19 growth rates, supply chain disruptions, and governmental decisions. *Eur J Oper Res*. 2021;290(1):99–115. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.08.001>
14. Novoszel L, Wakolbinger T. Meta-analysis of supply chain disruption research. *Oper Res Forum*. 2022;3:1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s43069-021-00118-4>
15. Passarelli M, Bongiorno G, Beraldi P, Musmanno R, Filice L. Supply chain management in case of producer disruption: between external (instable) forces and effective models. *Procedia Comput Sci*. 2023;217:1305–1315. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2022.12.328>
16. Paul S, Kabir G, Ali SM, Zhang G. Examining transportation disruption risk in supply chains: A case study from Bangladeshi pharmaceutical industry. *Res Transp Bus Manag*. 2020;37:100485. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2020.100485>
17. Hendricks KB, Singhal VR. An empirical analysis of the effect of supply chain disruptions on long-run stock price performance and equity risk of the firm. *Prod Oper Manag*. 2005;14(1):35–52. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2005.tb00008.x>
18. Henrich J, Li J, Mazuera C, Perez F. With supply chains in the spotlight, three new long-term transformation priorities form a fresh focus for competitive advantage. *McKinsey & Company*; 2022. <https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/operations/our-insights/future-proofing-the-supply-chain>
19. Ivanov D. Predicting the impacts of epidemic outbreaks on global supply chains: A simulation-based analysis on the coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2) case. *Transp Res Part E Logist Transp Rev*. 2020;136:101922. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2020.101922>
20. Queiroz MM, Ivanov D, Dolgui A, Fosso Wamba S. Impacts of epidemic outbreaks on supply chains: mapping a research agenda amid the COVID-19 pandemic through a structured literature review. *Ann Oper Res*. 2020;1–38. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03685-7>
21. Sharma A, Adhikary A, Borah SB. Covid-19's impact on supply chain decisions: Strategic insights from NASDAQ 100 firms using Twitter data. *J Bus Res*. 2020;117:443–449. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.05.035>
22. El Baz J, Ruel S. Can supply chain risk management practices mitigate the disruption impacts on supply chains' resilience and robustness? Evidence from an empirical survey in a COVID-19 outbreak era. *Int J Prod Econ*. 2021;233:107972. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107972>
23. Ponomarev SY, Holcomb MC. Understanding the concept of supply chain resilience. *Int J Logist Manag*. 2009;20(1):124–143. <https://doi.org/10.1108/09574090910954873>
24. Scholten K, Schilder S. The role of collaboration in supply chain resilience. *Supply Chain Manag*. 2015;20(4):471–484. <https://doi.org/10.1108/SCM-11-2014-0386>
25. Pettit TJ, Croxton KL, Fiksel J. Ensuring supply chain resilience: development of a conceptual framework. *J Bus Logist*. 2013;34(1):46–76. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jbl.12009>
26. Sheffi Y. Building a resilient supply chain. *Harv Bus Rev*. 2005;83(10):1–4.

- <https://hbr.org/2005/10/building-a-resilient-supply-chain>
27. Tukamuhabwa B, Stevenson M, Busby J, Zorzini M. Supply chain resilience: definition, review and theoretical foundations for further study. *Int J Prod Res.* 2015;53(18):5592–5623. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2015.1037934>
 28. Gölgeci I, Kuivalainen O. Does social capital matter for supply chain resilience? Empirical evidence from an emerging market context. *J Purch Supply Manag.* 2020;26(3):100617. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pursup.2019.100617>
 29. Wieland A, Wallenburg CM. The influence of relational competencies on supply chain resilience: a relational view. *Int J Phys Distrib Logist Manag.* 2013;43(4):300–320. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPDLM-08-2012-0243>
 30. Tang CS. Robust strategies for mitigating supply chain disruptions. *Int J Logist Res Appl.* 2006;9(1):33–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13675560500405584>
 31. Christopher M, Peck H. Building the resilient supply chain. *Int J Logist Manag.* 2004;15(2):1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1108/09574090410700275>
 32. Jüttner U, Maklan S. Supply chain resilience in the global financial crisis: an empirical study. *Supply Chain Manag.* 2011;16(4):246–259. <https://doi.org/10.1108/13598541111139062>
 33. Kamalahmadi M, Parast MM. A review of the literature on the principles of enterprise and supply chain resilience: major findings and directions for future research. *Int J Prod Econ.* 2016;171(1):116–133. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.10.023>
 34. Dolgui A, Ivanov D. Exploring the ripple effect in supply chains: definitions, frameworks and empirical cases. *Int J Prod Res.* 2021;59(1):1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2020.1835711>
 35. Brandon-Jones E, Squire B, Autry CW, Petersen KJ. A contingent resource-based perspective of supply chain resilience and robustness. *J Supply Chain Manag.* 2014;50(3):55–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jscm.12050>
 36. Govindan K, Fattahi M, Keyvanshokoo E. Supply chain network design under uncertainty: a comprehensive review and future research directions. *Eur J Oper Res.* 2017;263(1):1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.04.009>
 37. Bode C, Wagner SM. Structural drivers of upstream supply chain complexity and the frequency of supply chain disruptions. *J Oper Manag.* 2015;36:215–228. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2014.12.004>
 38. Thun JH, Hoenig D. An empirical analysis of supply chain risk management in the German automotive industry. *Int J Prod Econ.* 2011;131(1):242–249. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2009.10.010>
 39. Manuj I, Mentzer JT. Global supply chain risk management. *J Bus Logist.* 2008;29(1):133–155. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2158-1592.2008.tb00072.x>
 40. Spiegler VL, Naim MM, Wikner J. A control engineering approach to the assessment of supply chain resilience. *Int J Prod Res.* 2012;50(21):6162–6187. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2012.710764>
 41. Carvalho H, Azevedo SG, Cruz-Machado V. Agile and resilient approaches to supply chain management: influence on performance and competitiveness. *Logist Res.* 2012;4(1–2):49–62. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12159-012-0064-2>
 42. Haraguchi M, Lall U. Flood risks and impacts: A case study of Thailand's floods in 2011 and research questions for supply chain decision making. *Int J Disaster Risk Reduct.* 2015;14(3):256–272. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.09.005>
 43. Rice JB, Caniato F. Building a secure and resilient supply network. *Supply Chain Manag Rev.* 2003;7(5):22–30.
 44. Christopher M, Rutherford C. Creating supply chain resilience through agile six sigma. *Crit Eye.* 2004;14(5):24–28.
 45. Sheffi Y, Rice JB. A supply chain view of the resilient enterprise. *MIT Sloan Manag Rev.* 2005;47(1):41–48. <https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/a-supply-chain-view-of-the-resilient-enterprise/>
 46. Colicchia C, Strozzi F. Supply chain risk management: a new methodology for a systematic literature review. *Supply Chain Manag.* 2012;17(4):403–418. <https://doi.org/10.1108/13598541211246558>
 47. Tang CS, Veelenturf LP. The strategic role of logistics in the industry 4.0 era. *Transp Res Part E Logist Transp Rev.* 2019;129:1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2019.06.004>
 48. World Trade Organization. Trade Policy Review Body – Monitoring Report, November 2020. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tp_r_e/tp_rep_e.htm
 49. European Commission. EU Strategic Dependencies and Capacities – SWD(2021) 352 Final. Brussels; 2021. <https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/45984>
 50. European Parliament. Post Covid-19 value chains: options for reshoring production back to Europe in a globalized economy. Brussels; 2021. <https://doi.org/10.2861/118324>
 51. Giovannetti G, Marvasi E, Ricchiuti G. The future of global value chains and international trade: An EU perspective. *Ital Econ J.* 2023;9:851–867. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40797-023-00252-4>
 52. Amighini A, et al. Open strategic autonomy: From policy concept to operational toolbox. *LUISS School of European Political Economy Policy Brief*; 2023.
 53. Baldwin R. The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization. *Belknap Press*; 2016.
 54. Goldberg PK, Reed TR. The Unequal Effects of Globalization. *J Econ Lit.* 2023;61(1):185–233. <https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20201659>
 55. Antràs P. De-globalisation? Global value chains in the post-COVID-19 age. *Econ Policy.* 2021;36(106):265–311. <https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiaa019>
 56. Johnson RC, Noguera G. Accounting for intermediates: Production sharing and trade in value added. *J Int Econ.* 2012;86(2):224–236. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2011.10.003>
 57. Baldwin R, Evenett S. The collapse of global trade, murky protectionism, and the crisis: Recommendations for the G20. *CEPR eBook*; 2009.
 58. Bonadio B, Huo Z, Levchenko AA, Pandalai-Nayar N. Global supply chains in the pandemic. *Natl Bur Econ*

- Res Working Paper No.* 27224; 2020. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w27224>
59. Di Stefano E, Mancini M, Petrella A. Global Value Chains: Risks and Resilience. *Bank of Italy Occasional Papers No.* 652; 2022.
 60. Espitia A, Mattoo A, Rocha N, Ruta M. Trade and the COVID-19 crisis in developing countries. *World Econ.* 2022;45(2):548–568. <https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.13159>
 61. Eppinger PS, Egger P, Koch M. Decoupling global value chains. *Am Econ J Macroecon.* 2023;15(1):259–295. <https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20210297>
 62. Dhingra S, Ottaviano G, Sampson T, Van Reenen J. The consequences of Brexit for UK trade and living standards. *CEP Brexit Analysis No.* 2; 2017.
 63. Broadbent B, Leombroni M, Parker M. The trade and investment effects of Brexit. *Bank of England Staff Working Paper No.* 1014; 2023.
 64. Fajgelbaum PD, Goldberg PK, Kennedy PJ, Khandelwal AK. The return to protectionism. *Q J Econ.* 2020;135(1):1–55. <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz036>
 65. Raga S, Pettinotti L, Lal SS, et al. Food, fertilizer and fuel crises: How multilateral action can address a compounded global emergency. *ODI Policy Briefing*; 2022. https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI_Policy_brief_Triple_Crisis.pdf
 66. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. *Trade and Development Report 2022*. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/tdr2022_en.pdf
 67. World Bank. *World Development Report 2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2020>
 68. WTO. *World Trade Report 2022: Climate change and international trade*. https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/wtr22_e/wtr22_e.pdf
 69. Juhász R, Lane J, Redding S. The local economic impacts of automation and trade: Evidence from the US. *Natl Bur Econ Res Working Paper No.* 29322; 2021. <https://doi.org/10.3386/w29322>
 70. CSC – Centre for Strategic Capacities. *EU Strategic Dependencies and Capacity: Second Stage of In-Depth Reviews*. Brussels; 2022.
 71. FM Global. *Resilience Index 2022*. <https://www.fmglobal.com/research-and-resources/tools-and-resources/resilience-index>
 72. DHL. *Resilience360 Annual Risk Report 2021*. <https://www.resilience360.dhl.com>
 73. OECD. *Global Trade and COVID-19: Initial Sectors Affected*. Paris; 2020. <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/global-trade-and-covid-19-initial-sectors-affected-54f0f45f>
 74. Ivanov D, Das A. Coronavirus (COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2) and supply chain resilience: a research note. *Int J Integr Supply Manag.* 2020;13(1):90–102. <https://doi.org/10.1504/IJISM.2020.107780>
 75. PWC. *COVID-19: Operations and supply chain disruption*. 2020. <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/crisis-solutions/covid-19.html>
 76. Accenture. *Build Supply Chain Resilience: Reshape Supply Networks*. 2022. <https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insights/consulting/supply-chain-resilience>
 77. BCG – Boston Consulting Group. *The Resilience Imperative: Succeeding in Uncertain Times*. 2021. <https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/supply-chain-resilience-in-uncertain-times>
 78. McKinsey Global Institute. *Risk, Resilience, and Rebalancing in Global Value Chains*. 2020. <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/operations/our-insights/risk-resilience-and-rebalancing-in-global-value-chains>
 79. World Bank. *Africa's Pulse: Climate Change and Green Growth*. 2022;25. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/37284>
 80. UNDP. *Gender and COVID-19: Emerging Gender Data and Why It Matters*. 2021. <https://www.undp.org/publications/gender-and-covid-19-emerging-gender-data-and-why-it-matters>
 81. ITC – International Trade Centre. *SME Competitiveness Outlook 2021: Empowering the Green Recovery*. <https://www.intracen.org/SMECO2021>
 82. WTO. *Trade impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict*. 2022. https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/rese_07jun22_e.htm
 83. IMF. *World Economic Outlook, April 2022: War Sets Back the Global Recovery*. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/04/19/world-economic-outlook-april-2022>
 84. UN ESCAP. *Resilient Supply Chains for a Sustainable Asia-Pacific*. 2021. <https://www.unescap.org/kp/2021/resilient-supply-chains-sustainable-asia-pacific>
 85. ITU – International Telecommunication Union. *Measuring digital development: Facts and figures 2022*. <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/facts/default.aspx>
 86. GSMA. *The Mobile Economy 2022*. <https://www.gsma.com/mobileeconomy/>
 87. UNIDO. *Industrial Development Report 2022: The Future of Industrialization in a Post-Pandemic World*. <https://www.unido.org/resources-publications-flagship-publications-industrial-development-report-series/idr2022>
 88. OECD. *Enhancing SME resilience through digitalisation*. 2021. <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/enhancing-sme-resilience-through-digitalisation-cdb4c6b6/>
 89. UNECA. *Africa Trade Policy Centre – COVID-19 & African Trade*. 2021. <https://archive.uneca.org/pages/africa-trade-policy-centre-covid-19-african-trade>
 90. FAO. *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World*. 2022. <https://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/2022/en/>
 91. WTO. *Trade in Medical Goods in the Context of Tackling COVID-19*. 2020.

- https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/rese_03apr20_e.htm
92. UNICEF. *COVID-19 and School Closures: Impact on Children's Learning and Wellbeing*. <https://data.unicef.org/resources/learning-losses-due-to-covid-19/>
 93. ILO. *ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the World of Work, 9th Edition*. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/coronavirus/impacts-and-responses/WCMS_767028/lang--en/index.htm
 94. WEF. *The Global Risks Report 2022*. <https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report-2022/>
 95. ISO. *ISO 22301: Business Continuity Management Systems*. <https://www.iso.org/iso-22301-business-continuity.html>
 96. ISO. *ISO/IEC 27001 – Information Security Management*. <https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html>
 97. World Economic Forum. *How to Make Supply Chains More Resilient*. 2021. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/03/how-to-make-supply-chains-more-resilient/>
 98. UN Global Compact. *Uniting Business to Respond to COVID-19*. <https://unglobalcompact.org/take-action/20th-anniversary-campaign/uniting-business-to-respond-to-covid-19>
 99. OECD. *COVID-19 and Global Value Chains: Policy Options to Build More Resilient Production Networks*. <https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/covid-19-and-global-value-chains-policy-options-to-build-more-resilient-production-networks-04934ef4/>
 100. UNCTAD. *Global Trade Update – July 2022*. <https://unctad.org/news/global-trade-growth-slows-july-2022>
 101. Urak F, Bilgic A, Florkowski WJ, Bozma G. Confluence of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine conflict: Effects on agricultural commodity prices and food security. *Borsa Istanbul review* [Internet]. 2024 Feb 1;24(3). Available from: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845024000280>
 102. Ahmed S, Assaf R, Rahman MR, Tabassum F. Is geopolitical risk interconnected? Evidence from Russian-Ukraine crisis. *The Journal of Economic Asymmetries* [Internet]. 2023 Nov 1;28:e00306. Available from: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S170349492300018X?casa_token=IEeDImpCd2kAAAAA:cOXc_vl3xASfsWFXyVvmY8ePms1cF183pBXmPxZSXy8pM7g-Ofow6DAo-if_Q2-KqEa12IU6MQ